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You are all familiar with the criticisms typically made of
government regulation of industry. It is costly. Too little is recovered in return. The results of regulation are unpredictable,
perhaps random. Regulatory procedures are unfair and unwieldy. And, the process as a whole is undemocratic, indeed illegitimate, entrusting critical decisions to an unelected bureaucracy. The perception that these criticisms are accurate-at
least in some instances-has led to a widespread demand for
"regulatory reform." This evening, I should like to discuss two
approaches to reform: the "case-by-case" approach, which I shall
illustrate by talking about airline deregulation, and the "generic" approach, which seeks a single statute that will significantly improve regulation as a whole. To provide the conclusion
of this lecture in advance, I prefer the former to the latter. This
lecture is designed to illustrate why.
I.

THE "CASE-BY-CASE"

APPROACH

I chose airline deregulation as an example of "case-by-case"
reform both because I know the example first hand-I helped
*Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. This article is the text
of remarks made by Judge Breyer for the Benjamin Adger Hagood Lecture at the Uni-

versity of South Carolina School of Law, March 11, 1982. Portions of this talk were
based upon parts of Chapters 16 and 17 of Judge Breyer's book, Regulation and Its
Reform (Harvard University Press 1982).
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Senator Edward M. Kennedy to organize his hearings on economic regulation of the industry in 1974-and because it seems
to be a success. When we began our hearings the Civil Aeronautics Board fully regulated fares and entry into the industry.
Fares were high. It cost $183 to fly one-way cross country in
1973 and discounts were unavailable. Planes flew half
full-nearly two-thirds empty on transcontinental flights. Industry profits were low. Today, after the Board initially relaxed its
regulation, after it then administratively deregulated the industry, and after a new law made those changes permanent, fares in
real terms are on average significantly lower. We can fly cross
country today for $179 despite a Consumer Price Index which
has more than doubled. Planes are full. Industry profits are
somewhat improved (depending on the secter of the industry)
and the number of available flights, with a handful of debatable
exceptions, has increased. The consensus of most experts is that
airline deregulation is a reform that is working. Hence, it might
be useful, in the first half of this lecture, to consider some of the
elements that I believe were essential in bringing about
deregulation.
In 1974 common wisdom said that airline regulation could
not be reformed. Washington lawyers, noting the fairness of
many Board procedures and the clarity of its policies, considered
the CAB a well run agency, not an agency calling for radical
change. Economists, it is true, pointed out that regulation meant
prices that were too high and wasted service. But, those who
studied government as well, such as George Stigler, argued that
their cause was hopeless. Did not those who benefited from regulation-the industry and its workers-constitute small, well organized groups, willing and able to exert strong political pressure, while those who would benefit from deregulation were
consumers-particularly pleasure travelers-who were unlikely
to be aware of the issue or to feel strongly enough to organize
around it for political purposes?
In fact all we had in 1974 was an academic theory explained
by a handful of economists. The airline industry, they claimed,
is structurally competitive. Entry barriers are not high. The
firms within it strive to compete. Moreover, the pattern of
flights is complex, and demand, varying with the business cycle,
is volatile. What will happen, they asked, if a regulatory agency
tells the firms within such an industry that they cannot compete
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in price? The answer is that firms will compete in service instead. Thus, we shall find gourmet meals, flying "Aloha Bars,"
and, most important, many frequently scheduled, half empty
flights. As one of our witnesses put it, "the business traveler is
delighted to find an empty seat on which to rest his brief case.
But, would he be so pleased if he realized that he is paying full
fare for the brief case?" Of course, some of us did half realize
the political, as well as the economic, significance of this theory
-that it meant that, as a candidate for regulatory reform, the
CAB hung like a ripe plum ready for plucking. When Senator
Kennedy declared a strong interest in regulatory reform, it was
possible to argue that the CAB was the place to begin.
I should now like to go back to 1974-where we began with
an economic theory and Senator Kennedy's interest-and point
out four elements of the subsequent reform effort that I believe
were necessary to make the issue politically visible, which in
turn helped bring about the subsequent administrative and legislative reforms. I suspect these four elements will comprise a
necessary part of most efforts to bring about significant change
in an individual regulatory program.
A.

Detailed Information Gathering and Factual Analysis

First, and in my view most important, is a serious detailed
effort to gather and analyze facts related to the actual working
of the particular industry and regulatory program. The economic
theory at most offers a starting place and a framework for organizing the facts and arguments about whether change in the
program is necessary. But theory alone cannot show that change
is desirable. For one thing, any actual regulatory program may
in practice serve a host of subsidiary objectives that the theory
overlooks. Airline regulation, for example, might have saved fuel,
protected the environment, or stimulated the development of
small communities. For another thing, regardless of a program's
theoretical merits, firms, workers, customers, and suppliers may
have staked their investments-indeed their working lives-on
the regulatory status quo. An empirical effort must be made to
determine whether it is likely that change will produce benefits
that outweigh the costs of disturbing this fixed reliance. Further,
the truth of the theory depends upon the facts, and the facts are
often in the hands, not of academics, but of those in the indus-
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try. Academic studies showing that cross-country airline fares
were too high were far less convincing than projections by Boeing and Lockheed that with an all-coach seating configuration
and planes filled to seventy percent of capacity, an airline could
cover its costs in 1974 by charging about $100 per cross-county
ticket instead of $180. Finally, a detailed investigation is necessary to convince those with the necessary political power that
the proponents of reform have made their case-that the necessary homework has been done.
Let me give two examples, drawn from our hearings, of the
type of detailed, industry-specific work that is necessary. First
consider the controversy over the California and Texas experience with unregulated intrastate airlines. Open competition was
allowed in California until the mid-1960s. And the Texas Aeronautics Commission in the early 1970s allowed a new firm,
Southwest Airlines, into the market with freedom to cut fares.
The result was fares on non-CAB-regulated intrastate routes
only 50-60 percent as high as those on apparently comparable
(regulated) interstate routes. For example, in 1974 the traveler
flying 338 miles between San Francisco and Los Angeles on Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) paid $18.75; the traveler flying
the 339 miles between Washington and Boston on CAB-regulated carriers paid $41.67.
The regulated airlines argued that this comparison was misleading. California and Texas were "special cases." The fare differences reflected: (1) weather conditions, (2) greater traffic density, (3) direction of traffic flow, (4) less air and ground
congestion, (5) fewer costs from interline connections with other
carriers, (6) different aircraft types, (7) less need to provide
"through" service, and (8) less need to support other routes in
the system.
The subcommittee then tried to examine each of these factors. A check with the Federal Aviation Administration revealed
that there were no significant additional costs due to weather
differences. An analysis and comparison of a host of different
interstate and intrastate routes showed that the same price differences existed for routes of identical traffic density (for example, Los Angeles-Sacramento transporting 915,000 passengers
per year, and Boston-Washington transporting 981,000). By using "block-to-block" (ramp-to-ramp) times for purposes of comparison, one could eliminate the effects of air and ground con-
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gestion; again, the price difference stayed the same. The
subcommittee requested the Air Transport Association (the major industry trade association) to commission an independent
study of the causes of fare differences. That study showed that
the host of differences listed by the industry could account for
no more than $6 of a price difference that amounted to $20-30
on most routes. The subcommittee went on to request cost information from the airlines as to specific routes. American Airlines
submitted detailed information, which showed that their Boston-Washington flight cost $5,752 round trip, based on a Boeing
727-200, with 121 seats, filled on average 55 percent full. PSA,
flying the same plane in California, installed 158 seats, filled an
average of 60 percent full. Thus, if American had carried 95 passengers on average, as did PSA, instead of 66, it could have reduced its fares 30 percent. This fact went far toward showing
that the price difference reflected fuller planes, and it helped
support the argument that price competition induced the airlines to offer the lower-fare/fuller-plane service that most travelers wanted.
All information was compiled and sent to the airlines with a
request for confirmation, refutation, or additional information.
The information and the responses allowed the subcommittee to
write a section of its report that dealt comprehensively with the
California and Texas experience and carefully described the considerable extent to which it offered support for regulatory reform. The net result was that the argument against the use of
the California experience simply dropped out of the public debate. As late as the spring of 1975 the chairman of the board of
United Airlines, in a letter to The Wall Street Journal,vigorously defended the claim that California was a "special case,"
listing most of the factors mentioned above. Once the subcommittee's letter with its accompanying information was circulated,
however, the carriers stopped making the "special case" argument. Of course, the trained economist might not have needed
all that investigation in order to be convinced of the relevance of
the California experience. But the airlines themselves-and as a
result, the informed public-could not be convinced until they
were shown that their objections had been considered, treated
fairly, and investigated thoroughly. Then, however reluctantly,
they were convinced (or at least saw no further advantage in the
issue), and the point was established as valid in the public policy
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debate.
As a second example, let me describe how we dealt with the
most powerful argument against deregulation, namely, the argument that deregulation would mean an end of airline service to
smaller communities. The subcommittee's treatment of -the
"small town" argument illustrates the way in which different
types of evidence can be marshaled in support of a conclusion.
The argument (in support of regulation) consisted of the claim
that airlines earning large profits on popular routes used them to
subsidize service to smaller communities. The traditional reply
-that it was unfair to charge the cross-country traveler more to
subsidize the air travel of others-was unconvincing to those
who feared loss of service to their own smaller communities. After looking into the subject, the subcommittee agreed with general academic researchers in reaching a stronger conclusion: the
argument was weak because no significant amount of cross-subsidy existed. The subcommittee then supported the conclusion
with evidence.
First, the subcommittee report, drawing on the academic argument of George Douglas, James Miller, and George Eads,
claimed that it was illogical to believe that many airlines provided service on routes over which (incremental) costs exceeded
(incremental) revenues. For one thing, service competition (especially extra scheduling, which tends to reduce load factors) on
heavily traveled, long-distance routes would tend to eat up any
extra profit. And transcontinental load factors were indeed lower
than average system-wide load factors. In addition, the CAB for
some time had allowed carriers to abandon money-losing service.
Why would the carriers not have done so? Further, accounting
conventions tended to understate the profitability of short hauls.
Finally, commuter carriers already provided service to hundreds
of smaller communities and stood ready to pick up service that
the trunk lines abandoned.
These arguments, supported with facts, nonetheless proved
less convincing than an argument made on the basis of firsthand
experience with United Airlines. The committee asked United
Airlines to determine how many routes it might abandon under
deregulation because they were unprofitable in the sense that
revenues generated (in 1974) "failed to cover incremental costs."
United first wrote that it would consider abandoning as unprofitable 75 of the 327 city pairs that it served. It later revised its
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estimate to 58. I, as Committee Counsel, went to Chicago with

George Eads, then assistant director of the Council on Wage and
Price Stability, and spent a day going over a computer printout
of United's route system together with United's executives. By
the end of the day, there was agreement on several points. The
fact that United's accounting system showed these 58 routes as
unprofitable did not necessarily mean they were so, or would be
abandoned with deregulation. Four of the 58 routes were flown
in order to position aircraft; 17 were flown because they generated traffic that flew United to a farther point. These 21 city
pairs formed an essential part of a larger route than was profitable overall. Thus, United would classify only 37 routes as actually unprofitable. From these 37 one should subtract 8 more
routes, each of which was shorter than 60 miles in length, for it
was inconceivable that trunkline service was needed on routes of
24, 30, or 57 miles. (Such segments in fact formed part of a
larger "loss route," and these had been double counted.) There
remained 29 route segments that might be viewed as beneficiaries of cross-subsidy. These 29 segments averaged 155 miles
in length; they accounted together for 130 million revenue passenger-miles, or one-half of one percent of United's total domestic revenue passenger-miles. United claimed that it lost $5.5 million serving them. The important point is that if United's crosssubsidy experience was typical, and even if commuter airlines
did not pick up such abandoned routes, all such service (nationwide) could be retained through a small direct subsidy of $25
million. In other words, direct though impressionistic evidence
from the nation's largest airline showed the problem as relatively insignificant.
What I want you to retain from these examples is not the
detailed argument or conclusion, but rather the fact that they
are detailed and industry-specific. The detail and thoroughness
of the investigation (through the hearings) led to a comprehensive report. This, in turn, both increased the force of the proreform position in the public policy debate and also gave the
politicians the feeling that they knew what was at stake-that
airline deregulation was both desirable and safe to support.
B. Political Visibility
The second element essential to the reform effort is the
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drawing of the public's attention to the issue. If a reform is controversial, the politicians, whose support is necessary, are more
likely to become involved if they will be seen by their constituents and others as accomplishing a worthwhile objective. At the
same time, the more visible the issue, the more likely the politician will be questioned about it; hence he must prepare an answer. Further, visibility of a "good government," "reform" issue
is the most practical way to counteract the harm that the proreform politician would otherwise suffer at the hands of those
knowledgeable groups that prefer the regulatory status quo.
In the case of airline deregulation, the Kennedy hearings
made the issue politically visible. The press played a valuable
role in the process. The hearings called attention to the issue by
presenting it in dramatic form. They moved on two levels at
once. On one level they gathered in written form the masses of
dry, detailed fact needed to write a report and develop proposals. But they also moved on a more dramatic oral level, which
sought to illustrate the issues clearly and succinctly for the layman. The story could have been entitled, "how the CAB, which
is supposed to help the public by keeping fares low, is hurting
the public by keeping fares high." It was told through the structure of the hearings-a different aspect on each of eight days
-and through the organization of witnesses. On the first day,
for example, representatives of five major government departments and leading independent economists all testified that the
CAB policies were detrimental to the public interest. Only the
airlines supported the CAB. This arrangement immediately
raised a set of dramatic questions. Why was the relation between
Board and industry friendly, while that between Board and Executive Branch hostile? The first day of hearings raised that
question; the remaining seven days answered it. Moreover, the
hearings were structured issue by issue to present confrontations. There were claims, responses, rebuttals, rather in the
manner of a court proceeding. Questions were designed to bring
out the main points in a fairly simple way. For example, the
Board never could satisfactorily explain why it spent 60 percent
of its enforcement resources trying to stop fares that were too
low and only 3 percent investigating complaints that fares were
too high. The question of "why are fares 40 percent lower in California?" became devastating, because the Board simply did not
have a good answer.
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For another thing, the hearings produced some newsworthy
events. On the first day the Administration announced at the
hearings a new deregulating policy. The next day, the New York
Times wrote on its front page, "[d]enouncing the impact of the
Civil Aeronautics Board as inequitable, inefficient, and uneconomical, the Ford administration said today that it would introduce legislation aimed at substantially reducing the power of
the Board to regulate the airline industry." The article went on
to describe Senator Kennedy's hearings, thus calling attention to
their existence and suggesting that they constituted a major
event. Other newsworthy events chided the Board for denying
that it had unlawfully frozen route awards only to be confronted
with a "secret" Board memo proving the contrary, and for its
officially announcing the abandonment of its restrictive route
policies. These events and others illustrated-in a manner likely
to be conveyed to the public-deep, sophisticated problems with
the basic concept of airline regulation.
The press, perhaps stimulated by the apparent likelihood of
significant changes in Board policy, also wrote about the lengthy
report that emerged-though not for its dramatic qualities. The
report was designed to be a thorough analysis of the relevant
issues, drawing upon the facts produced for the hearings and
upon the detailed industry and Board comments upon earlier
drafts. Business Week, for example, wrote "the Report is the
greatest in-depth analysis of airline affairs since regulation of
the industry began in 1938 and it effectively answers many of
the proregulation arguments of the airlines and CAB. It provides
the economic underpinnings for major changes at the CAB."
Without the previous press attention these stories would not
have been written. But they were written and may significantly
have raised the issue's visibility-to the point where President
Carter, campaigning in 1976, made the issue his own, and later,
as President, appointed to the Board a chairman, Alfred Kahn,
committed to making the necessary changes.
C. Creating a Political Coalition Favoring Reform
The third element of this individual case history was the
establishment of a broad political coalition favoring reform. This
in large part is a function of characterizing the issue, as it becomes visible, in a way that will strengthen the alliance in its
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favor. Thus both President Ford and Senator Kennedy depicted
airline deregulation as part of a broader effort to help the consumer and to lessen the burdensome regulatory bureaucracy. If
the issue is seen as one of "lower prices," "helping the consumer," or "freeing business from the dead hand of regulation,"
it can pick up support from many persons who will not interest
themselves in "higher airline profits," "more efficient use of aircraft," or "more efficient or effective airline regulatory programs." Political support is, in part, a function of how one sees
the issue-how it has been characterized-and that is a matter
partly, but not wholly, within the control of those who seek
reform.
The coalition must be formed both inside and outside the
government. Without the support of much of the Department of
Transportation, the Council of Economic Advisors, the Department of Justice and others within the government, the CAB
could not have been isolated and the White House was less
likely to have picked airlines as a showcase of regulatory reform.
On the outside, coalitions can be built by looking not only to
those with similar economic interests, but also those with similar
ideological views. Thus, not only consumer groups supported airline deregulation, but so did business groups, conservative senators and others who believed in laissez faire, while the industry
and unions sought the support of politicians whose ideological
instincts favored regulation.
D. PracticalArrangement for Reform and Transition
A fourth element of case-by-case reform is the need for a
practical reform plan. The reformer must develop a practical
and fair plan to allow a transition from the regulated regime to
the new system. Such a plan serves three functions. First, it
demonstrates that the reformer has thought the problem
through, to the point where one can see concretely who is likely
to be helped or hurt over the next few years. This fact helps
overcome a fairly common fear of the unknown. Second, it allows the reformer to ease the adverse effects of sudden change
on those who might be hurt. To force those who have relied on
the past system to face sudden drastic change without some sort
of cushion is often unfair. Third, from a strictly political viewpoint, a transition plan that cushions adverse effects and allows
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those who gain from the change to compensate losers will soften
the political opposition and facilitate its passage.
Airline deregulation did not require a complex transition
system. Rather, the announcement of its consideration together
with the several years needed to bring the new system into being
-through the appointment of a new CAB chairman and the enactment of new legislation-itself provided gradual change,
cushioning the effect of the change and allowing those affected
time to adjust.
I do not believe that the airline regulatory reform effort
would have been successful had it not embodied the four elements. Even so, the effort took time. We began in 1974 and 1975
with Senate hearings. President Ford then appointed a new
CAB Chairman, John Robson, who began to relax the Board's
restrictive regulations. The first concrete result was National
Airline's "no-frills" fare to Florida in early 1976. President
Carter issued a position paper favoring airline deregulation during his campaign. He appointed Alfred Kahn, an economist, as
Chairman of the CAB, and Kahn chose his top staff in large part
from those who had been strong advocates of reform, some of
whom had worked on the hearings. Kahn began the process of
administratively deregulating. Senator Cannon held additional
hearings and a deregulation law, sponsored by both conservative
and liberal senators, was enacted in 1978. Airline deregulation-with a few hitches-has been underway for the last five
years.
To recapitulate, I have listed four elements of the airline
regulatory reform effort that I believe were essential to the effort's success. They included (1) a detailed information gathering effort and factual analysis; (2) an effort to achieve political
visibility; (3) the creation of a coalition centered on airline reform; and (4) a practical arrangement for transition. My motive
in describing these elements in detail is to show you that they
are program-specific. While trucking regulation, for example,
presents a quite similar economic problem, the trucking reform
effort has required enormous time and effort focused upon the
trucking industry itself. The form of any such effort may be capable of generalization, along the lines of my four elements. The
effort's content, however, is drawn from the specific industry
and program under consideration. Any such reform effort takes
time, but as both airlines and trucking suggest, the results can
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be dramatic.
II.

THE "GENERIC"

APPROACH

I should now like to discuss an entirely different approach
to regulatory reform. I call it the "generic" approach, for it seeks
to apply a single set of changes to many different programs or
agencies in an effort to make them all work better. Most generic
changes-proposed over the past fifty or sixty years-fall into
three categories: proposals for better personnel, for better procedures, and for better governmental "structures."
Those who have argued for the appointment of better people to positions of agency responsibility have not satisfactorily
met the problems of how to identify those people and how to get
them appointed. I doubt that many senators would call the President and say, "I should like you to appoint Smith, a man who is
badly qualified for the job." Moreover, if we knew for certain
who these better people were, should we have them running regulatory agencies? Perhaps the nation would be better off if they
ran health programs, large businesses, disarmament conferences,
or labor unions. To call for "better appointments" answers every
problem of government, and for that reason, answers none.
"Better procedure" tends to be the lawyer's answer to most
problems. Today, there are those proceduralists who would like
to make the informal rulemaking process more formal. There are
others who would like to make the formal rulemaking process
less formal. While I would not deny that a bit more or a bit less
cross-examination can sometimes make a difference, it is difficult to believe that changes in agency procedure can bring about
any major change in government regulation.
If "better procedure" is the law school approach to regulatory reform, changing management structure reflects the point
of view of the business school. Thus, in the past the Ash Council
recommended making the independent agencies less independent and replacing many collegial regulatory bodies with "single
heads." It is not difficult, however, to think of many single
headed agencies which are considered failures and collegial bodies which are viewed as comparative successes. Indeed, it is easy
to remember a time when those who wished to reform the Federal Trade Commission urged that the chairman have less
power; with a change in personnel, they began to urge that the
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chairman have more power. While management structure may
indeed make a difference, I am skeptical of its ability to achieve
systematically different results.
In any event, the generic reform proposals currently most
popular foresee a different form of structural change. They share
a common view of the cause of regulatory failure, namely, "the
agencies lack adequate control." They share a common response,
namely, "let us supervise the agencies more closely." Of course,
one immediately asks, "how?" Who will do the supervising?
Given our form of government, it is not surprising that there are
three possible answers: the Legislature, the Executive, and the
Judiciary. Indeed, each of the three prime generic reform proposals currently under discussion chooses a different branch of
the government as its prime supervisor. Let us examine each of
them more closely.
A.

The Legislature

The most popular current proposal would give one or both
houses of Congress an opportunity to veto any major rule of an
agency after it is promulgated but before it takes effect. Those
favoring the veto point to the enormously broad power that
Congress has delegated to the agencies: the FCC is to award licenses on the basis of "the public interest, convenience, and necessity"; OSHA is to ensure "safe" and "healthful" places of employment; the FTC is to eliminate "unfair and deceptive"
practices. They claim that more narrowly drafted regulations are
impractical, yet the public's elected representatives ought to influence directly or check the manner in which that power is
exercised.
The veto, they claim, provides a desirable, practical check
on the growing power of the President and the agencies. The size
of government has increased exponentially since 1789. The
knowledge explosion has made it nearly impossible for Congress
to cope with the needs of the electorate. Congress must respond
flexibly to specific problems, yet finds it difficult to generate detailed expert factual information and is captive to what the executive branch tells it about the need for legislation. Thus, the
only practical way for Congress to set legislative policy within
the "separation of powers" framework is for it to delegate
broadly and then to disapprove agency actions that it does not'
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like.
Those opposing the veto argue- that it will, in practice, become a congressional staff veto. Agencies in self-defense will
have to seek the advice of congressional staff before promulgating a rule, and participants will therefore try to convert that
staff before approaching the agency. Since Congress has no set
procedures for doing so, the parties will thereby circumvent
agency procedures designed to allow all parties to see and comment upon one another's claims. Moreover, all the special interests will look to Capitol Hill for a second bite at the apple. The
rules likely to be debated or vetoed will be those to which affected groups attract a committee chairman's attention. Thus,
Congress might be more likely to intervene where an agency
seeks to regulate powerful private interests. Further, the existence of the veto would make it difficult to plan. An ICC chairman could not plan to introduce a comprehensive procompetitive reform of trucking regulation, because his pricing regulation
might be approved while his entry regulation was vetoed. Finally, the political effect on the members of Congress is itself
uncertain. A veto might give them more power, but at the same
time it may lead their constituents to hold them directly responsible for all the actions of the bureaucracy.
Although legislative veto provisions have been enacted with
increasing frequency and nearly three hundred appear in different pieces of legislation (particularly appropriations bills), their
constitutionality is in question. Every recent administration,
whether Democratic or Republican, has argued that the veto is
unconstitutional. They claim that it violates the "presentation
clause" of the Constitution-the clause that requires all legislation to be presented to the President for his approval or veto
prior to becoming law. They also argue that the one-house veto
violates article I, section 1 of the Constitution, which requires all
legislation to secure the approval of both houses of Congress. Of
course these clauses only apply to "legislation." Congress can
only exercise "legislative" power (with certain specified exceptions), and therefore cannot constitutionally exercise a veto unless the veto is a form of legislation.
The proponents of the veto find this reaboning too formalistic. Given the reasonableness and desirability of the legislative
veto, the Constitution's language should be broadly interpreted
to allow it. The Court of Claims decided by a vote of four to
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three that a one-house veto was constitutional, but the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently ruled
against its constitutionality. The Supreme Court has agreed to
decide the question.
The two arguments that I find most convincing are first,
that the "veto" would bring Congressional staffs directly into
the day to day work of the agency. This would be hard to do in a
way that is on balance likely to improve the process. Second, the
veto is unlikely to have led to deregulation of airlines, of trucking or major reform elsewhere. It is a proposal that primarily
favors the status quo.
B.

The Executive

Proposals that would strengthen the President's power to
influence agency policies have been made in the past (by Professor Emmette S. Redford) and more recently by Lloyd Cutler and
Senator Roth, who argue that the President has become unable
to coordinate policies among the executive branch and independent agencies. With the support of the American Bar Association, they propose a statute that would allow the President to
direct an agency to take up and decide any regulatory issue
within a specified period of time or to modify or reverse an
agency rule or policy. In other words, the President himself, acting under certain procedural constraints, could reverse most
agency policy making. Presidential action would be subject to
congressional review either through a legislative veto process or
by requiring Congress to renew the President's authority at regular intervals.
A statute is required because most regulatory statutes delegate power not to the President but to the agency head. Thus,
the President cannot overrule the agency head on a particular
matter, but can only dismiss a regulator who displeases him. Andrew Jackson, for example, could not overrule his secretary of
the treasury when the secretary refused to withdraw public
funds from the Bank of the United States, but he could (and
did) fire him. The result is that agency heads in practice have
considerable autonomy, because Presidents are unwilling to fire
a major public official except over a very important matter.
Some who hesitate to undermine this agency autonomy still seek
to increase coordination by encouraging groups of regulators and
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White House officials to meet regularly to discuss policy matters.
There is much to be said for the Cutler proposal. It would
allow the President to bring about increased policy coordination
among agencies, to prevent major departures from his policies,
and to prevent actions he would consider seriously mistaken. It
would also involve him more directly in regulatory matters, providing increased opportunity for major change. Since the Council of Economic Advisors and the Bureau of the Budget have
great influence on the White House staff, changes in these areas
changes might be in a procompetitive direction.
On the other hand, the proposal has its problems. For one
thing, will it mean that groups adversely affected by agency action simply come to the White House for a second opportunity
to defeat it? For another, even if a President is less willing to
protect a special interest than is, say, a subcommittee chairman,
his agenda is still highly political. Arguably, political considerations should not be brought to bear piecemeal upon individual
agency regulations. Moreover, why is the President's policy
likely to be so much more sensible than the agency's? One might
argue that the President has higher-quality economic advice
available in the Council of Economic Advisors or the Bureau of
the Budget; but the agency has many more facts at its disposal
and is more familiar with them. Would the proposal require a
much larger White House staff?. Further, if the President follows
the advice of his economists, will he inject economic considerations where Congress specifically did not want them? In the final
analysis the direction that any reform takes under the proposal
depends upon the substantive policy directions preferred by the
President. The proposal itself produces little pressure to move in
any one direction.
C.

The Judiciary

Senator Bumpers and many other critics of the regulatory
process would have the courts examine the rules, regulations,
and legal decisions of agencies with greater care. At present,
courts tend to reverse such agency decisions if the decisions are
arbitrary or outside the authorizing statute. In practice, courts
defer to agencies on many legal matters, the exact degree of deference depending upon a host of factors, including the nature of
the legal decisions at issue. The basic object of Senator Bump-
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ers' proposal is to encourage more active court review and less
deference.
The aim of this proposal is to assure agency fidelity to congressional statute. Agency decisions will have to be more carefully supported in the record, and agency employees will have to
be more careful. Judges will be encouraged to learn more about
the technical bases for agency decisions-to learn statistics, if
necessary, and to understand scientific language and reasoning.
Fewer irrational agency decisions will take effect.
Bumpers' proposal, while popular in the legislature, has its
drawbacks. Even if its intent is only to send a signal to the
courts to defer less to the agencies, how much less deference
ought there to be? Would one want, for example, to insist that
judges rehear the merits of, say, the "separations manual" for
allocating the joint costs of telephone service? Do the courts
have the time or the resources to examine such decisions de
novo? From a political perspective, one cannot be certain which
groups will be favored. The business community, for example,
might like to see OSHA take greater care, but it may feel that
greater scrutiny of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission means
only longer delay in issuing licenses. From the perspective of
regulatory policy, the effect of the proposal is also indeterminate. As the example of natural gas regulation makes clear, it is
sometimes the courts, not the agencies, that seek to expand the
scope of regulation. By slowing down agency proceedings and examining more closely the relation of the agency decision to the
authorizing statute, will stricter review mean less experimentation? Will it make agencies hesitate to look for new but less restrictive ways to carry out their mandate?
Moreover, to what extent are courts likely to bring about
better substantive policies by giving agency decisions a "harder
look"? Appellate judges base their decisions on a record. This
record typically reflects a trial, a hearing, or some other procedure under which lawyers present evidence and make arguments. This system is fair (at least if the contesting parties have
roughly equivalent resources) because the parties have a roughly
equivalent chance to present their own side of the story and contest that of their opponents. It is reasonably accurate as to typically adjudicative matters such as who did what to whom when.
But are these typical courtroom procedures accurate as to the
hotly contested, constitutional, uncertain matters of legislative
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policy? Is carnauba wax really dangerous? What about
saccharine? A record on these subjects made at length by paid
advocates reflects what they choose to put in it; such a record,
once made, is not readily changed; and the judge who reviews
the record cannot use the telephone to clarify obscurity or to
discover, by calling different experts, the present state of scientific knowledge. When society's interest is that a matter be decided fairly, court-type procedure and judicial review may help.
When society, however, is vitally interested in the accuracy of
the result and when legislative facts are at issue, I am less sanguine about the usefulness of legalistic procedure.
As I end this discussion of generic proposals for structural
reform, I believe I have said enough to make two basic points.
First, I have explained what generic proposals are, illustrated
those that are currently popular, and demonstrated that the extent to which they will bring about significant reform is debatable. Second, it should be clear that none of these proposals embodies, or encourages the development in any individual case, of
the four elements that I identified as essential to the success of
airline deregulation. They do not foresee individual detailed
work related to the particular regulatory program and affected
industry; they provide no mechanism for bringing an instance of
needed reform to the public's attention; they do not augment
the creation of political coalitions; and they do not encourage
the creation of practical transition plans. On the other hand,
they do apply to many different programs and thus arguably will
improve regulation "across the board."
III.

CONCLUSION

Now that I have set before you two quite different approaches to regulatory reform, let me, in conclusion, pose several
questions. These questions will suggest why I prefer the case-bycase approach.
1. Is airline regulation the only instance in which "reform"
means radical change of an existing regulatory program? The
answer to this question is "no." Trucking regulation, for example, is already undergoing major reform. Students of the regulatory process have suggested that major change is also appropriate in other areas. Should classical regulation designed to
minimize large windfall profits, as in the case of natural gas reg-
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ulation, be replaced with windfall profit taxes? Should there be
less economic regulation of ocean shipping? Should existing
"command and control" regulation of the environment be supplemented with "environmental taxes" or "marketable rights?"
Should safety regulation encourage collective bargaining on
safety issues-perhaps with governmental participation? To
what extent should the agencies search for "less intrusive" forms
of regulation that might be both less burdensome and more effective in achieving the regulation's ends? Enough work has
been done to suggest that many regulatory programs are candidates for major substantive reform of one kind or another.
2. How is "generic reform" of the sort proposed going to encourage the more radical changes in specific existing programs
that may be needed?
3. If the generic proposals now being considered are not
likely to bring about needed reform because they do not contain
or encourage case-by-case efforts structured in terms of the four
elements I have discussed, is it wise to devote scarce political
time and effort to these generic proposals?
4. Are there other generic proposals that might encourage,
in an institutional sense, the case-by-case approach in individual
instances? Certain proposals of this sort-mostly variations of
the "sunset" name-have been suggested but are not now at the
top of the Congressional agenda. All this, of course, simply suggests the obvious conclusion: the task of "regulatory reform" is
difficult but not impossible. And, much work remains to be
done.
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